Government  Largesse  and Constitutional Rights: Some Paths Through and Around the Swamp by Kreimer, Seth F.
University of Pennsylvania Carey Law School 
Penn Law: Legal Scholarship Repository 
Faculty Scholarship at Penn Law 
1989 
Government "Largesse" and Constitutional Rights: Some Paths 
Through and Around the Swamp 
Seth F. Kreimer 
University of Pennsylvania Carey Law School 
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/faculty_scholarship 
 Part of the Civil Rights and Discrimination Commons, Ethics and Political Philosophy Commons, 
Jurisprudence Commons, Law and Society Commons, Legal Theory Commons, Politics and Social 
Change Commons, Social Policy Commons, Social Welfare Commons, and the Social Welfare Law 
Commons 
Repository Citation 
Kreimer, Seth F., "Government "Largesse" and Constitutional Rights: Some Paths Through and Around the 
Swamp" (1989). Faculty Scholarship at Penn Law. 1247. 
https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/faculty_scholarship/1247 
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by Penn Law: Legal Scholarship Repository. It has been 
accepted for inclusion in Faculty Scholarship at Penn Law by an authorized administrator of Penn Law: Legal 
Scholarship Repository. For more information, please contact PennlawIR@law.upenn.edu. 
Government "Largesse'' and 
Constitutional Rights: Some Paths 
Through and Around the S\'vamp 
SETH F. KREIMER* 
In convening the panel out of which this paper grew, Professor 
Alexander suggested, in polite terms, that when it comes to the in­
teraction between government benefits and constitutional rights the 
Supreme Court is stuck in a swamp. Theory regarding this area, he 
asserted, is "chaotic," and "lacks an identifiable core." My theses 
here are twofold: both that the swamp is narrower, and that it is 
more passable, than it appears at first glance. However, unlike some 
of the participants, I do not view the center of the swamp as an 
illusion which will dissolve in the light of modern, or post-modern 
constitutional theory. 
A. Two Boundaries: Process and Structure 
Before entering any swamp we should begin by ascertaining its 
boundaries. The idea that allocations of government "largesse" are 
subject to substantially different constitutional constraints than other 
government actions is hardly a new one in constitutional law.1 Its 
* Associate Professor of law, University of Pennsylvania. This paper is based on 
remarks before the Constitutional Law Section of the Association of American Law 
Schools in New Orleans in January !989. 
I .  The suggestion that the "unconstitutional conditions" problem is an artifact of 
the decline of the constitutional status of common law property rights in the aftermath of 
the New Deal is simply inaccurate. While the term "largesse" is a Frankfurterian coin­
age (Joint Anti-Fascist Comm. v. McGrath, 341 U.S. 149, 173 (195!) (Frankfurter, J., 
concurring)), the problem arises whenever government has discretionary authority to al­
locate benefits. Such authoritv is not confined to the modern welfare state. 
In the early 18th century, 
'
the scheduling of creditors' remedies was manipulated to 
attempt to extract waivers of the creditors rights under the legal tender clause. Townsend 
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roots in the folk v;isdom, that "beggars can't be choosers," go deeper 
still.2 Nonetheless, there are areas to which this perception is mani­
festly inapplicable. 
If there is one case which defines the aspirations of American con­
stitutional law and scholarship in the last generation, it is Brown v. 
Board of Education.3 Yet Brown is at its root a case about "lar­
gesse." It does not quarrel with the proposition that the state has no 
obligation to provide public schools, but proclaims that "[s]uch an 
opportunity, vo�here the state has undertaken to provide it ... must 
be made available to all on equal terms."4 
This result has been replicated regularly over the last generation.� 
Whether the "largesse " in question has been access to parks6 or to 
medical school,7 tax exemptions,8 social security payments,9 or gov­
ernment contracts,1° government actions in distributing "largesse" 
v. Townsend, 7 Tenn. (Peck) 1 (1821). States used the power to license foreign corpora­
tions to prohibit or punish the invocation of federal diversity jurisdiction with varying 
success. E.g., Doyle v. Continental Ins. Co., 94 U.S. 535 (1876); Home Ins. Co. v. 
Morse. 87 U.S. (20 Wall.) 445 (1874). In the throes of Reconstruction, both state and 
federal governments sought to impose loyalty oaths as conditions of obtaining profes­
sional licenses. See, e.g., Cummings v. Missouri, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 277 (1867); Ex Parte 
Garland, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 333 (1866). And, the power to control access to the mails 
was used to suppress newspapers which carried accounts of lotteries. fn re Rapier, 143 
U.S. 110 (1892) .  
While the scope of the state's discretionary authority to allocate benefits has expanded 
in the modern era, the terms in which the problem of allocational sanctions are analyzed 
by modern courts are notably reminiscent of the arguments of a century ago. For a his­
tory. see Kreimer. Allocational Sanctions: The Problem of Negative Rights in a Positive 
State, 132 U. PA. L REV. 1293, 1301-51 (1984). 
2. Cf. FCC v. League of Women Voters, 468 U.S. 384, 403 (1984) (Rehnquist, 
J., dissenting) (invoking "Faust and Mephistopheles''). 
3. 347 U.S. 483 ( 1954) .  
4. !d. at 493. 
5. See, e.g., Kadrmas v. Dickinson Public Schools, I 08 S. Ct. 2481 (I 988); Plyler 
v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202 (1982) ;  San Antonio Indep. School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. I 
(1973); cf. West Virginia State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 656, 657 (1943) 
(Frankfurter, J., dissenting) (suggesting that gratuitous character of public education 
removed first amendment difficulties from compulsory Aag salute). Bur cf. Cummings v. 
Richmond County Bd. of Educ., 175 U.S. 528 (1899). 
It could be argued that Brown involved a characteristically sovereign activity linked to 
school attendance laws. However, such a claim reckons without the cases relied on in 
Brown, cases which involved higher education, as to which no attendance requirement 
applied. See Mclauren v. State Regents for Higher Educ., 339 U.S. 637 (1950) ;  Sweatt 
v. Painter, 339 U.S. 629 (1950) ;  Sipuel v. Board of Regents, 332 U.S. 631 (1948) (per 
curiam); Missouri ex ref. Gaines v. Canada, 305 U.S. 337 ( 1938), as well as subsequent 
applications of Brown to other gratuitous public facilities. 
6. E.g., Fowler v. Rhode Island, 345 U.S. 67 (1953); Niemotko v. Maryland, 340 
U.S. 268 (1951) .  
7. Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265 (1978). 
8. Kahn v. Shevin, 416 U.S. 35l (1974) .  
9. E.g., Heckler v. Matthews, 465 U.S. 728 (1984); Califano v. Westcott, 443 
U.S. 76 (1979) ;  Weinberger v. Weisenfeld, 420 U.S. 636 (1975) .  
10. City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 109 S.Ct. 706 (1989); Fullilove v .  Klutz­
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have been as fully subject to scrutiny under the equal protection 
clause as have invocations of sovereign force. 
Conceptually, the conclusion is entirely sensible. If equal protec­
tion principles are construed as disabling government from acting on 
the basis of arbitrary hostility, racial animus, or insufficient public 
justification, the constraints apply whenever government makes a 
choice. \Vhether the choice concerns "largesse" or regulation is on 
its face irrelevant. The "evil eye ... and unequal hand"11 are for­
bidden, regardless of the powers they wield. 
The point can be generalized. To the extent that constitutional 
constraints are directed to the process by which governmental deci­
sions are made, the issue of whether the subject of those decisions is 
a penalty or a subsidy should be of no constitutional moment. If 
under the constitution we may regard only statutes adopted after 
presentment to the President as valid, a legislative veto is invalid 
whether it affects regulation or "largesse."12 If, under the first 
amendment, government is forbidden to act out of a desire to sup­
press a point of view, then a case involving removal of schoolbooks, 
or denial of access to government property, which identifiably grows 
out of such a desire13 should be no more difficult than a case involv­
ing a criminal prohibition with the same roots.14 If due process re­
quires reasonable notice, hearing, and an impartial decision-maker, a 
secret or self-interested decision without notice would be problem­
atic, whether it concerned deprivation of welfare benefits or contin­
gent remainder interests.15 To the legal mind, there should be no 
II. Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356, 373-74 (1886). 
12. Immigration and Naturalization Serv. v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 9 19 (1983) (Ar­
guably, Chadha involved "largesse" in the sense that the suspension of deportation was a 
dispensation of a gratuitous benefit, as a matter of grace); cf Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 
I (1976) (dispensation of government funds unconstitutional where Federal Election 
Commission members were selected in violation of appointments clause). 
13. E.g., Cornelius v. NAACP Legal Defense and Educ. Fund Inc., 473 U.S. 788 
(1985) (denial of access to federal consolidated charity drive campaign would be uncon­
stitutional if based on desire to suppress a point of view); Board of Educ. v. Pica, 457 
U.S. 853 ( 1982) (removal of books based on desire to suppress a point of view would be 
unconstitutional). 
14. E.g., Boos v. Barry, 108 S.Ct. 1157 (1988). So, too, the majority in City of 
Lakewood v. Plain Dealer Pub. Co., 108 S. Ct. 2138 (1988), took the position that even 
where permits for news vending boxes could be denied entirely, a process of dispensing 
such permits by the unguided discretion of the mayor was inconsistent with the proce­
dural protections against censorship required by the first Amendment. Even the dissent­
ers were defensive about the majority's accusation of "embracing the greater-includes­
the-lesser syllogism- one that this Court abandoned long ago." !d. at 2159 (White, J., 
dissenting). 
15. Compare Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254 ( 1970) with Mullane v. Central 
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paradox here: the "right" to a fair trial is not dependent on a right 
to prevail in the verdict.16 
There is another face to Brown, concerned not with the prohibition 
of racially hostile decision-making, but with the prevention of racial 
subordination. On this side as well, the impact on the "hearts and 
minds" of students and society was recognized in the distribution of 
"largesse," no less than in the imposition of penalties.17 This legacy 
of Brown has found less hospitable reception in recent terms of the 
Court.18 But whether racially subordinating impact is accepted or 
rejected as a constitutional variable, the constitutional significance of 
such effects does not depend on whether the impact arises from pen­
alties or subsidies. 
This analysis, too, should present no theoretical difficulty. A con­
stitutional theory keyed to the impact of government actions on the 
structure of society, whether out of a concern with avoiding the es­
tablishment of a permanent "underclass,"19 or a goal of minimizing 
government-imposed "stigma,"20 is not likely to let much turn on 
whether such impacts are brought about by "largesse" or regulation. 
This observation suggests another boundary to our quagmire. A 
large class of constitutional limitations preserve particular structures 
of relations between the state and citizen or within the government. 
Where a constitutional constraint is triggered by the impact of a 
government intervention on other governmental or social structures, 
the question of whether the impact is brought about by subsidies or 
penalties is constitutionally irrelevant. If, for example, we were seri­
ous about judicially enforcing a strict allocation of decision-making 
authority exclusively to the states in certain areas as a constitution-
Hanover Bank and Trust. 339 U.S. 306 (1950). 
Frankfurter, of course, would not have agreed. His introduction of the concept of "lar­
gesse" in Joint Anti-Fascist Refugee Comm. v. McGrath. 341 U.S. 123 ( 1951) (Frank­
furter, J., concurring), was designed to embody the exclusion of governmental privileges 
from the demands of due process. The revolutionary nature of Goldberg v. Kelly was 
precisely its rejection of that exclusion. 
16. Professor Alexander's description of the problem as involving two "states of 
affairs", with and without distribution of largesse, is thus seriously incomplete, for the 
constitution is often concerned with the process by which the state of affairs is brought 
about. 
17. Compulsory attendance was not crucial to the result here, either. Cf Griffin v. 
School Bd. of Prince Edward County, 377 U.S. 218 (1964) (decision by school board to 
close the public schools rather than desegregate was impermissible). 
18. Compare, e.g., Lau v. Nichols, 414 U.S. 563 (1974): Griggs v. Duke Power 
Co., 401 U.S. 424 ( 1971); Norwood v. Harrison, 4 13 U.S. 455 (1973) with, e.g, McCles­
key v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279 ( 1987); Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229 (1976). 
19. Plyler v. Doc, 457 U.S. 202, 2 18-19 (1982). 
20. E.g., Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 361-62 ( 1978) 
(Brennan, J., White, J., Marshall, J., and Blackmun, J., concurring and dissenting); 
United Jewish Organizations v. Carey, 430 U.S. 144 (1977); cf Wright v. City Council 
of Emporia, 407 U.S. 451 (1972): Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. of Educ., 402 
U.S. 1, 26 ( 1971). 
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ally mandated structure, Justice Roberts would have been quite right 
in United States v. Butler21 to view a subsidy program whose impact 
falls in the state domain as illegitimate, and the dissenters would 
have been as correct in South Dakota v. Dole22 and FERC v. Mis­
sissippi.23 If we believe today that a government censor astride the 
flow of political speech by former government employees is a mecha­
nism antithetical to democratic government,2·1 the mechanism should 
not be saved because the employees have acquiesced to it in ex­
change for the "largesse" of federal employment.25 And, if one of 
21. 297 U.S. 1 (1936). 
22. 483 U.S. 203 ( 1987). 
23. 456 U.S. 742 (1982), reh'g denied, 458 U.S. 1131 (1982); cf South Carolina 
v. Baker, 108 S. Ct. 1355, 1362 (1988)(rejccting as a "mischievous proposition of law" 
the claim that "the United States [could) convert an unconstitutional tax into a constitu­
tional one simply by making the tax conditional. Whether Congress could have imposed 
the condition by direct regulation is irrelevant; Congress cannot employ unconstitutional 
means to reach a constitutional end."). 
Of course, most of the current Justices are not serious about judicial enforcement of 
federalism constraints against the political branches. Even Justice Rehnquist, who 
threatened in his dissent in Garcia v. SAMTA, 469 U.S. 528 (1985) , to resurrect the 
doctrine of National League of Cities v. Usery, 426 U.S. 833 (1976), at the first availa­
ble opportunity, wrote the majority decision in Dole, which seems to contemplate virtu­
ally no limits to the extension of federal hegemony under the spending power. 483 U.S. 
203 ( 1987). Only Justice O'Connor seems to be consistent in her vision of an untram­
meled role reserved to the states. See, e.g., South Carolina v. Baker, 108 S. Ct. 1355, 
1371 ( 1988) (O'Connor, J., dissenting); Dole, 483 U.S. at 212 (O'Connor, J. dissenting). 
24. Cf Lamont v. Postmaster General, 381 U.S. 30 l. 306 ( 1965) ("The Act sets 
administrative officials astride the flow of mail, to inspect it, appraise it, write the ad­
dressee about it, and await a response before dispatching the mail. . . .  This amounts in 
our judgment to an unconstitutional abridgment of the addressee's First Amendment 
rights."); Block v. Meese, 793 F.2d 1303, 1314 (D.C. Cir. 1986) (Scalia , J.) (" It may 
well be that threat, and thus suppression would be the consequence of a scheme for 
systematic review of books and films by an official evaluator , in order that the govern­
ment may label their content approved or condemned."). 
25. Compare Snepp v. United States, 444 U.S. 507 (per curiam), reh 'g denied, 
445 U.S. 972 ( 1980) (implying that nondisclosure requirement could have been imposed 
on CIA employee even without agreement) with National Fed'n of Fed. Employees v. 
United States, 688 F. Supp. 671 (D.D.C. 1988)(challenging lifetime nondisclosure agree­
ments requiring federal approval of all subsequent writings by large class of federal em­
ployees with access to "classifiable documents"), vacated and remanded sub nom., Amer­
ican Foreign Service Assn. v. Garfinkel, 109 S. Ct. 1693 (1989). One commentator 
estimates that 120,000 federal employees may be subject to lifetime censorship obliga­
tions, and almost 5,000,000 are subject to censorship obligations while they are federal 
employees. Burnham, The Bureaucracy: Hear No Evil, See No Evil, Publish No Evil, 
Times, Aug. 16, 1984, § B, at 14, co l .  3. 
I have argued elsewhere that efforts by the government to induce its employees to 
forego first amendment activities are a substantial impairment not only of the employees' 
free speech interests, but of the interests of the citizenry in self-government. Kreimer, 
Government, Economic Power, and Free Speech: Can the State Buy Silence?, 1988 TEL 
AVIV u STUD. IN L 265. 
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the functions of the establishment clause is to disable the govern­
ment from symbolically allying itself with one religion, an endorse­
ment in the form of public largesse is as problematic as an endorse­
ment backed by a transfer of government authority.26 
This, too, is no new wisdom. In guarding the President's compen­
sation against either reduction or increase during his term, the fram­
ers of the Constitution were fully cognizant of the tension between 
institutional independence and the allocation of "largesse." As Ham­
ilton commented in Federalist 73, without limitation on congres­
sional authority over presidential compensation: 
[TJ he separation of the executive from the legislative departmcn t would be 
merely nomina! and nugatory. The legislature. with a discretionary power 
over the salary and emoluments, of the Chief Magistrate could render him 
as obsequious to their will as they might think it proper to make him. They 
might, in most cases, either reduce him by famine, or tempt him by lar­
gesses, to surrender at discretion his judgment to their inclinations.27 
By contrast, a fixed salary precluded "pecuniary inducement to de­
sert the independence intended by the constitution."28 
The more constitutional limitations are conceived of in terms of 
process or structure, the narrower the boundaries of the swamp be­
come. At the extreme, if all constitutional limitations are thought to 
function in terms of process or structure, rather than as protecting 
individual autonomy, the problem will disappear entirely. Therefore, 
the most important initial questions the Court confronts in the area 
of "largesse" concern the proper conceptualization of the constitu­
tional constraints before it. 
B. Into the Swamp: Autonomy, Prediction. Equality, and 
Historv 
This analysis suggests that the problem of "largesse" (or what I 
call "allocational sanctions"), if not its solution, does have an " iden­
tifiable core." We tend to conceive of certain constitutional rights as 
bound up with the liberty of individuals; they guard the autonomy of 
individual citizens' wills for their own sake. Indeed, if Brown was the 
. 26. Compare, e.g., Texas Monthly, lnc. v. Bullock, 109 s: Ct. 890 ( 1989) (sales 
tax exemptions limited to religious writings unconstitutional) wilh Larkin v. Grendel's 
Den, Inc., 459 U.S. 116 (1982) (effective delegation of veto power over liquor permits to 
religious institutions impermissible). 
27. THE FEDERALIST No. 73, at 441 (A. Hamilton) THE FEDERALIST PAPERS (C. 
Rossiter ed. 1961). 
28. !d. at 442. lt is worth noting that the Congressional attempts to block the 
President's efforts to require federal employees to agree to submit future writings to fed­
eral C(:nsorship as a condition of federal employment the.mselves took the form of impos­
ing C0nditions on funding for the executive branch ("largesse"). Those en-orts were held 
by the disuict court to violate separation of powers principles. National Fed'n of Fed. 
Employees v. United States. 688 F. Supp. 671 (D.D.C. 1988), vacataf and remanded 
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constitutional paradigm of the last generation, Roe v. Wade,29 with 
its emphasis on substantive protection of individual privacy and lib­
erty, has set the tone for the central controversies of this genera­
tion.30 With respect to constitutional rights so conceived, the alloca­
tion of "largesse" contingent upon the exercise of those rights is 
constitutionally distinguishable from the imposition of coercive "pen­
alties" imposed for similar conduct. An offer of "largesse," in ex­
change for waiver of a private autonomy right, provides the citizen 
with two options where before she had only one; the range of her 
autonomy has been increased. The prohibition of such offers would 
decrease the scope within which the citizen could exercise her auton­
omy. By contrast, a penalty exacted for exercise of the right narrows 
her options and restricts her autonomy. It is only the restriction that 
"abridges" a constitutional right identified with individual options. 
An example drawn from a constitutional "liberty" which has en­
joyed some vogue in the Burger and Rehnquist courts illustrates this 
point. In Wooley v. Maynard, the Court held that the state of New 
Hampshire could not constitutionally require its citizens the Wooleys 
29. 410US.l l 3(1973). 
30. A number of commentators have sought to ground the result in Roe in consti· 
tutional theories that rest outside of a protection of individual autonomy. Some efforts 
rely on arguments about the prerequisites of equality for women in our society. E.g .. 
Karst, The Supreme Court. 1976 Term - Fore.,.,•ord: Equal Ciri:enship Under rhe 
Fourteenrh Amendmenr, 91 HARV. L. REv. i. 57-59 (1977): Hirshman. Bronre. Bloom 
and Bark: An Essay on rhe Moral Educarion ol Judges, 137 U PA L REv. 177, 209-24 
( 1988): Regan, Rewriring Roe v. Wade, 77 MICH. L REv 1569 ( 1979). Some explicate 
limits on government's authority to shape the lives of its citizens rooted not in individual 
rights, but in conceptions of the good society. E.g. Rubenfeld. The Righi of Privacy 102 
HARV. L REv. 737,788-91 (1989): Hirshman. supra, at 224-30. Some attempt to formu­
late the limitation in terms of decisions which are structurally inappropriate for political 
resolution. E.g., Tribe, The Supreme Courr !972 Term- Foreword: Toward a Model 
of Roles in rhe Due Process of Life and Law. 87 HARV L REv I. 21-25 (1973): Pollak, 
.rldvocaring Civil Liberries: A Young Lawyer Before £he Old Courr. 17 HARV CR.-CL 
L REv. 7 ( 1982). Professor Tribe has since abandoned this tack in favor of a combina· 
lion of autonomy-based and equality-based theories. L. TRIHE. co�STITUTIO:\AI. LAW 
1350 (2d ed. 1988) 
These sophistications have all, thus far, eluded the Supreme Court majority. which 
continues to write in terms of a "right of privacy." Thornburgh v. ACOG. 476 U.S. 747 
( 1986). The Court had another chance to refine its approach this term in Websrer. but it 
failed to avail itself of the opportunity. Webster v. Reproductive Health Servs .. 109 S. 
Ct. 3040 ( 1989). 
To the extent that the Cour� rests a retention of the right to reproductive choice in 
either arguments about equality or about structure, the dif1iculties surrounding "lar· 
gesse" will be elided in this area. Still, other manifestations of the "privacy" right are 
difficult to disentangle from ciaims of individual autonomy. t.'.g .. Bowers v. HJrdwick, 
478 U.S. 186 ( 1986) (dissent): Zablocki v. Red hail, 434 L.S. 374 ( 1978): Stanley v. 
Georgia, 394L.S. 557 (1969); Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965): Skinner v. 
Oklahoma, 316 L.S. 535 ( 1942) 
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to place the motto "Live Free or Die" on their license plates on pain 
of criminal penalty.31 An effort by the state to rent advertising space 
on the sides of the Wooleys' vehicle for a similar message, however, 
would presumably face no comparable constitutional impediments. 
The first 3.mendment autonomy interest in the right to silence, which 
protects against penalties levied on silence, would not limit the abil­
ity to extend rental offers which expand the range of choices availa­
ble to the citizen. 
The swamplike aspect of the problem, however, arises when we 
recall that, "constitutionally speaking," the right to operate vehicles 
on a state's highways is "largesse." If New Hampshire had no con­
stitutional duty to license the Wooleys' auto, why should we not con­
ceive of the extension of the license as a "rental fee" for the use of 
their auto's communicative potential? 
One might believe, as Professor Epstein seemed to advocate, that 
the key lies in the anticompetitive monopoly that New Hampshire 
holds over its roadways.32 Let us remember, however, that the next 
major invocation of the Wooley principle was the holding in Abood33 
(of which Epstein approves)34 that a job (of which Epstein reminds 
us there are many)35 could not be conditioned on payment of politi­
cally objectionable union dues. Nor is the key a general difference 
between the scrutiny accorded to prohibitory regulation backed by 
criminal sanction and allocational sanctions. In Abood and its prog­
eny,36 the sanction for nonpayment of the objectionable dues was the 
loss of a job, not a fine or imprisonment. The result should be no 
different if the sanction had been the loss of any other unrelated 
31. Wooley v. Maynard, 430 U.S. 705 (1977); cf, e.g., Abood v. Detroit Bd. of 
Educ., 431 U.S. 209 ( 1977) (requiring employee to pay dues used for union political 
activities to which member objects violates first amendment); Pacific Gas and Elec. Co. 
v. Public Utils. Comm'n, 475 U.S. 1 (1986) (requiring public utility to include consumer 
group's materials in billing envelope violates first amendment). Riley v. National Fed'n 
of the Blind, 108 S. Ct. 2667 (1989) (requiring non-profit fundraisers to state to poten­
tial donors the percentage of funds previously turned over to charity violated first 
amendment). 
32. Epstein, Foreword: Unconstitutional Conditions, State Power and rhe Limits 
of Consent, 102 HARV. L. REv. l ,  16-21 (1988) (monopoly a� justification for overriding 
contractual arrangements); see id. at 47 ("The first inquiry is to determine the extent of 
the government's monopoly power in its control of public highways."); id. at 56 ("Lake­
wood differs from Frost because . . .  city ownership of public streets gives government 
far less monopoly power."); id. at 71-73 (employment relations are inappropriate for 
unconstitutional conditions analysis because government has little monopoly power). Pro­
fessor Epstein's contribution to this symposium seems to envision monopoly as only one 
of the relevant variables. 
33. Abood v. Detroit Bd. of Educ., 431 U.S. 209 (1977). 
34. Epstein, supra note 32, at 92. 
35. Epstein, supra note 32, at 71-73 ("little danger of monopoly" in government 
employment). 
36. Communications Workers of Am. v. Beck, 108 S. Ct. 2641 (1988); Chicago 
Teachers Union v. Hudson, 475 U.S. 292 (1986); Ellis v. Brotherhood of Ry. , 466 U.S. 
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benefit. Conversely, there is wide acceptance of parole conditions like 
those imposed on the late Jimmy Hoffa, where immunity from the 
state's monopoly on legitimate coercive violence is conditioned on the 
nonexercise of conceded constitutional rights.37 
In analyzing the question of whether governmental conditions on 
"largesse" are properly regarded as impingements on constitutionally 
protected freedoms an initial ordering of intuitions can be achieved 
by attempting to determine whether the government's offer leaves 
the citizen with a broader range of choices than she would have had 
in the normal course of events.38 To my mind, the reason it is im­
plausible to characterize New Hampshire's condition as an offer to 
purchase space on the Wooleys' car is rooted in the expectations that 
surround vehicle licensing; in the normal course of events, licenses 
are granted ministerially. If New Hampshire were unable to condi­
tion its license on display of its message, it is unlikely that the li­
censes would be denied entirely. The leverage it has over the 
Wooleys is essentially free to the state; the Wooleys receive no com­
pensation for the forfeiture of their rights. 
This perception - that the prediction of what the state would do 
if purchasing constitutional rights were not an option is a crucial 
baseline from which to begin analysis - has both moral and func-
37. Hoffa v. Saxbe, 378 F. Supp. 1221 (D.D.C. 1974) (upholding parole condition 
requiring Hoffa to refrain from union politics); see Griffin v. Wisconsin. 483 U.S. 868 
(1987); Schick v. Reed, 419 U.S. 256 (1974). 
38. Note that this is not the question of whether the citizen is better otT than if no 
benefits were extended at all. Cf. Garvey, Freedom and Equality in the Religion 
Clauses, 1981 SuP. CT. REv. 193, 201. If this were the test, a threat to discontinue 
employment in retaliation for criticism of the government would not be viewed as a viola­
tion of free speech. Cf. Rankin v. McPherson, 483 U.S. 378 ( 1987); Perry v. 
Sindermann, 408 U.S. 593 ( 1972). and a threat to discontinue welfare benefits because 
of the exercis'e of abortion rights would be consistent with substantive due process. Cf. 
Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. 297, 317 n. 19 ( 1980) (noting difference between refusal to 
provide Medicaid funding for abortions and attempt "to withhold all Medicaid benefits 
from an otherwise eligible candidate because that candidate had exercised her constitu­
tionally protected freedom to terminate her pregnancy"). 
In arguing that the useful starting point in determining whether an offer should be 
viewed as impinging on liberty is the "normal" course of events. I adapt a definition 
pioneered by Professor Nozick. See Nozick. coercion, in PHILOSOPHY. SciENCE AND 
METHOD 440. 447 ( 1969) (coercion exists when the threatened action will make one 
worse off than she "would have been in the normal or natural or expected course of 
events."). The phrase "normal course of events," of course, masks an array of difficulties. 
I suggest here. and at greater length in Kreimer, supra note I, three variables a court 
should consider in evaluating what should be considered "normal"; prediction, equality 
and history. Each variable draws. in a concededly eclectic fashion, on differing moral 
intuitions. My claim is that ignoring any of these variables leaves a decision-maker with 
an incomplete frame of reference. 
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tiona! roots. Morally, if we are to permit the sale of constitutional 
rights,39 it seems inappropriate to allow the state to purchase them 
with fools' gold. If the government's offer to purchase private consti­
tutional rights is justified because it expands the citizen's range of  
choice, an offer giving the citizen only what she would receive in any 
event cannot claim such justification. Conversely, the prohibition o f  a 
transaction in which the citizen gains nothing can hardly be viewed 
as putting her autonomy at risk. 
Functionally, a state forced to make a real expenditure in the 
purchase of rights is likely to evaluate more carefully whether the 
purchase is actually necessary. Fiscal constraints will set some 
boundaries on the tendency of the majority to impose its will. It is 
precisely the frugality of being able to purchase citizens' rights with 
funds already committed for other purposes which makes the oppor­
tunity to condition "largesse" an invitation to tyranny. 
To be sure, it will often be more difficult than it was in the 
Wooley case to predict the result of prohibiting a state's insistence 
on a forfeiture of rights.40 But counter-factual prediction is not the 
only plausible guide to defining the normal course of events that 
should serve as a baseline. Our intuitions can be sharpened by exam­
ining the issue in light of the claims of equality. Consider the prob­
lem of subsidizing the exercise of constitutional rights by tax exemp­
tion, which has recurred regularly in Supreme Court cases of recent 
years.41 A tax exemption available to most charitable activities, but 
denied to a single subset of those activities by virtue of the exercise 
of constitutional rights, seems to be a penalty. It leaves the disfa­
vored activities worse off than they would have been if they had been 
treated "normally," that is, in the same way as other charitable ac­
tivities. By contrast, an exemption provided to a smaller subset of 
39. There are often good arguments for regarding particular constitutional rights 
as either inalienable or, at least, not subject to sale to the government. The right to vote 
and the thirteenth amendment right against involuntary servitude are noncontroversial 
examples. I have reviewed the general arguments in Kreimer, supra note I ,  and the 
particular arguments in the context of free expression rights in Kreimer, supra note 23. 
Where a particular right is regarded as inalienable, for reasons peculiar to the right, 
there is yet another boundary to the reach of arguments from government "largesse." 
Given the relatively uncontroversial nature of government purchases of advertising, the 
rights at stake in Wooley are not of this variety. 
40. I have some first-hand experience with the intractability of the real world. 
Kreimer, Releases, Redress, and Police Misconduct: Reflections on Agreements to 
Waive Civil Rights Actions in Exchange for Dismissal of Criminal Charges, 136 U. PA. 
L. REv. 851 ( 1988), is an effort to predict the effect of prohibiting the release-dismissal 
practice. 
41. Texas Monthly, Inc. v. Bullock, 109 S. Ct. 890 (1989); Arkansas Writers Pro­
ject v. Ragland, 481 U.S. 221 (1987); Bob Jones Univ. v. United States, 461 U.S. 574 
(1983); Regan v. Taxation With Representation, 461 U.S. 540 (1983). Compare the 
problem of mailing privileges presented to the court in Minnesota Newspaper Ass'n v. 
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generally taxed actiVIties seems best regarded as a subsidy. It ex­
pands the range of choices available to the favored activity beyond 
those normally available.42 
As a general matter, nothing prevents the government from pro­
viding a subsidy to activities it favors. Thus, in Regan v. Taxation 
with Representation,43 the Court upheld a tax preference which al­
lowed lobbying by nonprofit veterans groups without loss of tax de­
ductible status, although other lobbying nonprofit groups were de­
nied that status.44 The distinction was held to be permissible on the 
ground that government was free to subsidize such activities. When 
government seeks to single out particular exercises of constitutional 
rights as grounds for denying tax benefits, as opposed to grounds for 
granting tax advantages, a different result is appropriate. In Arkan­
sas Writers Project v. Ragland,4r, Arkansas' sales tax exemption 
structure, which exempted all magazines published in the state with 
the exception of the Arkansas Times, was successfully challenged as 
an abridgment of the freedoms of press and speech.46 
The Texas scheme before the Court in Texas Monthly, Inc. v. 
Bullock,47 which exempted from sales taxes only a narrow class of 
publications "promulgating the teachings of a religious faith,"46 
presents a useful test case. Viewed from the baseline of equality, the 
scheme is not a penalty against the publications which are taxed; 
they are no worse off than they would be in the normal course of 
events, for most publications are subject to the sales tax.49 But, 
42. Note that this is an equality claim of a particular sort. Not all inequalities arc 
impermissible. only those in which an exercise of constitutional rights is singled out for 
disadvantage. Prizes are permissible; penalties are not. 
43. 461 U.S.540(1983). 
44. The Court has interpreted Regan's holding to rest on the fact that nonprofit 
groups remained free to use private funds to lobby by means of nondeductible affiliates. 
FCC v. League of Women Voters. 468 U.S. 364 ( 1984). An effort to condition a subsidy 
on silence on particular topics raises different questions. !d. See Kreimer, supra note 25. 
45. 481 U.S. 221 (1987). 
46. id. 
47. 109 S.Ct. 890 (1989). 
48. !d. 
49. This need not mean, however , that the tax is by that token consistent with the 
guarantees of freedom of the press. Justice White's position (!d. at 905 (White. J., con­
curring in judgment)). like that of Justices Blackman and O'Connor (!d. at 894 (concur­
ring in judgment)), is that taxes which discriminate on the basis of a publication's con­
tent are inconsistent with the press clause. absent compelling justilication. Cf. 
Minneapolis Star and Tribune Co. v. Minnesota Comm'r of Revenue. 460 U.S. 575 
(1983). Justice Brennan's plurality opinion does not address the issue. !d. at 901 n.7. 
A view of the press clause which is rooted in the structural support that an indepen­
dent press provides to the mechanisms of popular government might well regard the pos­
sibility of discriminatory taxation as so great a threat to press independence that discrim-
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again, if we use equality as a baseline, it see m s  clear that  religious 
publication have been singled out for preferent ial t reatment and sub­
sidy of religion runs afoul of the establishment cla use .  This,  indeed, 
was the analysis of a majority of the Court.50 W h a t  is crucial in 
setting the baseline is the breadth of the classes i ncluded or 
excluded. 
Like the use of prediction, a baseline grounded in equa l i ty has 
both moral and functional roots. Morally, the claims of equal i ty  i n  
an ethos of impartial respect for citizens are wel!-kno'.vn. Exclusion 
from a generally available benefit is a denigration quite unlike a spe­
cial grant of favor. Functionally, the broader the class subject to the 
relative disadvantage, the more powerful the political check exerted 
by the mechanisms of democracy itself.e;1  
Equality, of course, carries with it a burden of normative explora­
tion as heavy as the load of empirical investigation associated with 
prediction. It is old news that a requirement that simiiar cases be 
treated in a similar manner entails some metric to determine 
whether cases are indeed "similar." In some cases, common sense 
and common understandings can be sufficient to answer the question, 
particularly when only a single case is treated anomalously. But 
whether abortions are "like" other medical treatments which are 
funded, for example, in that they benefit the health of the pregnant 
woman, or "unlike" such treatments because of their effect on poten­
tial life, is a question that implicates deeper issues of constitutional 
doctrine. Sometimes the answers may be constitutionally com­
pel led,�2 and sometimes they may be i ll uminated by the choices im-
ination is per se impermissible, whether i t  is used to subsidize or penalize. Compare notes 
2 4- 25 supra. However, if unadulterated this view would raise questions about a wide 
range of press subsidies, ranging from second-class mailing privileges to press passes. My 
own view is that if t his analysis is to be credible, it must regard the vice of discriminatory 
taxation as lying in the confluence of its potential ly devastating impact and the un­
checked discretion it vests in the legislature. 
5 0. Bullock, 109 S. Ct. at 894 (Brennan, J., joined by Blackmun, J., and Stevens. 
J.) (" I t  is difficult  to view Texas' narrow exemption as anyth ing but state sponsorship of 
religious belief . . . .  What is crucial is that any subsidy afforded religious organizations 
must be warranted by some overarching secular purpose that justifies like benefits for 
nonreligious groups."); id. at 905 (Biackmun, J., concurring in the judgment, joined by 
O'Connor, J.) ("Texas engaged in preferential support for the communication of reli­
gious messages [which ] offends our most basic understanding of what the Establishment 
Clause is about."). 
Justice Scalia's dissent (joined by Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justice Kennedy), how­
ever, took the position that the exemption was not a "subsidy'' because it "merely re­
frained from diverting . . .  income independently generated by the churches," and was 
thus a permissible accommodation of religion. !d. at 907. 
5 1. See, e.g., Railway Express Agency v. New York, 336 U.S. 1 06 ,  1 12- 13 ( 1949) 
(Jackson, J., concurring) ("Nothing opens the door to arbitrary action so effectively as to 
al low. .officials to pick and choose only a few to whom they will apply legislat ion and 
thus to escape the political retribution that might be visited upon them if larger numbers 
were affected.") 
52. In Bullock, for example, the claim t hat religious publications were "different" 
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plicit  in the funding program. Still, clean results will often be elu­
sive. Argumen ts from a baseline of equality will often be fields on 
which broader normative issues are fough t  out. 
We should, therefore, not discount  the further insight t hat may be 
provided by history. It is often easier to determine what has h ap­
pened in the past than to predict w hat will be done in the future or 
to agree on normative premises necessary for a definition of equality. 
Withdrawal of a benefit historically available is more problematic, 
bot h morally and functionally, than a failure to grant the benefit in 
the first place. 
Morally, the baseline of history draws on bot h  prediction and 
equality. The fact t hat govern ment has granted a benefit in the past 
without the offensive conditions suggests, in t h e  absence of changed 
circumstances, t hat the best prediction is that it could be expected to 
do so in the future. From t h e  perspective of equality the grant  of 
benefits in the past allows prospective beneficiaries to raise claims 
that they have a prima facie righ t to similar treatment. A nd history 
has a third moral claim: disruption of expectations is itself an evil.l'>3 
Functionally, in  addition to reflecting the constraints of prediction 
and equality, a focus on history is sensitive to the phenomenon of 
sunk costs. Deprivation of curren t  "largesse " is more likely to dis­
rupt existing systems for exercising constitutional rights than the 
failure to grant new benefits. A newspaper, for example, is likely to 
feel the pressure of a denial of mailing privileges more strongly than 
the denial of access to a newly available source of satellite data. Op­
erating procedures and capital investments keyed to a given service 
in the first case are not constraints in the second. 
Finally, history casts light on the situation of government as well 
as t hat of the citizens. A govern ment that has entirely denied the  
proposed benefit in  the past can more plausibly claim it seeks to ex­
ercise no greater control over its citizens when it conditions a benefit 
than can a government that had previously gran ted such benefits. 
Moreover, the judicial interventions required to preserve the previous 
status quo may be less intrusive than t hose required to construct al­
ternate benefit structures which never previously existed. 
was held to be constitutional ly  barred by the establishment cla use. The state a rgued that 
i•  was constitutional ly  mandated to avoid state interference with rel igious activities. Bul­
lock. 1 09 S .Ct at 90 1 .  
5 3 .  Cf. Wygant v. Jackson Bd. of Educ , 476 U.S. 267 ( 1986) .  
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C. Theory, Proof, and Judgment 
These explorations of the swa mp suggest, I think, certain discrete 
cartographic tasks for theory, proof, and judgment. For theory, the 
challenge is to search out the bases in process and structure which 
undergird particular constitutional l imitations. To the extent tha t  a 
limitation finds its root outside of claims for individual autonomy, we 
can bypass the swa mp entireiy. The more the limitation is rooted in 
individual will, the more the swamp will impede our progress. 
Where we must traverse the swamp, we still need not be lost in 
the mire of trackless balancing, for, in terms of individua l  autonomy, 
the challenge is to investigate the relation of the conditioned "lar­
gesse" to the normal course of events. The tasks of proof and judg­
ment are to explore the context of the particular "largesse" at issue, 
along paths guided by landmar ks drawn from prediction, equa lity, 
and history. That those guideposts wil l  not a lways be clear, and that 
they may, on occasion, point in different directions should not unduly 
trouble us. The task of constitutional commentary can do no more 
than highlight the relevant consider ations which bear on a problem; 
it cannot make all problems easy. A judge cannot, in this a rea any 
more than in others, do without wisdom. 
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